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A Game Theoretic Approach For Global Cooperation In Climate control

Shalini Verma, Rajendra Kumar Kaushal

Abstract


Now a day climate change is a global problem and uncertain because of growing different greenhouse gases from different countries. Strategic action plays an important role in reducing the greenhouse gases. This paper presents an economic strategic model through different category of countries by using strategies (mitigation and abatement). This paper presents two player game and three player game. In two player game when two countries collaborates their profit increases by 6.25% and 8.13% and in three player game, grand coalition of three countries increases their profit by 4.17 % , 5.43% and 4.17 % respectively for country A, country B and country C and concludes that in both cases grand coalition is better and more profitable than participating individually. This paper shows that reduction in green house gases are possible only when all the countries work together through incentive.

 


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